In an original data set of goods listed for sale online, I observe that multiple selling mechanisms are popular with buyers and sellers in the compact disc market. I construct a model to explain how heterogeneous sellers choose between selling in an auction versus posting a …xed price. An important contribution of this work is that I model competing sellers instead of a monopolist. In doing so, I show that accounting for the competitive structure of the marketplace is vital in explaining the coexistence of mechanisms. In the model, the value of each seller's outside option is nonparametrically identi…ed. The main result of the paper is that sellers with more valuable outside options choose to post a …xed price. For buyers, my approach for estimating the unobserved number of potential buyers in each market compares favorably to an approach that assumes there are in…nitely many buyers. My …ndings are consistent with a highly competitive market that is more closely approximated by perfect competition than monopoly.
Introduction
Why do we observe goods o¤ered for sale simultaneously using di¤erent selling mechanisms? In a data set of compact disc sales online, I observe some sellers auctioning their goods and other sellers choosing to post a …xed price. Numerous papers in the mechanismdesign literature show that a seller earns higher expected revenues when selling via an auction. In fact, one can more easily list the papers that do not …nd the auction to be optimal;
I review several such papers in the next section. The question that motivates this paper is:
"given the wealth of theoretical evidence in favor of the auction mechanism, why would any seller post a …xed price when she has the option to sell in an auction?" I approach the question of mechanism coexistence in the context of a structural model of competing sellers. In this paper, I …nd that seller heterogeneity explains the structure of the market I examine. Speci…cally, sellers with more valuable outside options choose to post a …xed price. This result is in contrast to explanations for why mechanisms coexist that are based on di¤erences across buyers. Several such explanations do not hold in these data:
(1) the posted-price mechanism does not attract more buyers than the auction mechanism and (2) posted-price buyers do not have higher willingnesses-to-pay (though the distribution does have more area in its right tail).
An alternative approach in explaining coexistence is to show that, within the context of a particular model, a monopolist prefers an auction under certain conditions and the posted-price mechanism under other conditions. The conclusion one might draw is that the coexistence of mechanisms in a competitive environment can be explained by some sellers meeting the conditions that make auctions optimal, and other sellers meeting the conditions that make posted-price selling optimal. While such an exercise is useful in pointing out the relative merits of the mechanisms under study, it is unclear exactly how the insights from monopoly models extend to a more competitive environment. It is for this reason that I model the competition between sellers.
With competing sellers, it is increasingly di¢ cult to answer the question of coexistence without …rst developing a theoretical framework. Accordingly, I use a structural model where sellers enter either the auction or posted-price mechanism. The structural approach has become increasingly common in the empirical analysis of auction data, beginning with Paarsch (1992) and …rst used in the context of online auctions by Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) .
In my setting, a structural model is useful to isolate the determinants of coexistence because of the increased strategic interactions that are present when considering multiple sellers.
I use data from the online music compact disc (CD) market because it has several features that aid in the empirical analysis. First, this market is likely to be competitive, if only due to the fact that these goods are available at a number of retail outlets including Wal-Mart and Circuit City. Second, my data set features a lower ratio of buyers to sellers than is typically found in papers using eBay data.
1 If the number of buyers per seller is very large, it may be appropriate to ignore the strategic interactions between sellers. However, when sellers compete for a relatively small pool of buyers, it is vital to account for the competitive structure of the marketplace. Third, it is likely that the demand for CDs is driven by idiosyncratic tastes and preferences. This is consistent with an independent-private-values model in which buyers'values are independently drawn from a known distribution.
Monopoly Comparisons Between Mechanisms
In a number of di¤erent settings, a seller maximizes her expected revenue by o¤ering an auction. Under di¤erent assumptions, an auction is no longer optimal and can be inferior to other common mechanisms such as posted-price selling. Posting a …xed price is optimal if the monopolist's capacity exceeds potential demand (Harris and Raviv 1981) , while the posted price mechanism revenue-dominates auctions (but is not itself optimal) when buyers' values are highly interdependent (Campbell and Levin 2006) . Other work indicates that a revenue-maximizing seller may prefer the posted-price mechanism when: (1) buyers meet the monopolist sequentially and incur a participation cost (Ehrman and Peters 1994) ; (2) 1 Canals-Cerdá and Pearcy (2006) is an exception.
sellers are impatient or objects quickly become obsolete (Ziegler and Lazear 2003); or (3) bidder participation is costly relative to buying at a posted price (Ziegler and Lazear 2003) .
A key paper comparing auctions and posted-price selling is Wang (1993) . He argues that each mechanism entails di¤erent costs for the monopolist (an idea I extend to a competitive environment in this paper). Speci…cally, Wang assumes that an auction costs the seller a marginal cost (for storage) and a …xed cost incurred once per auction, while the postedprice mechanism costs the seller only a marginal cost (for displaying). While the optimal mechanism depends on the magnitudes of the costs, Wang shows that more dispersed values favor auctions. Zeithammer and Liu (2006) build on Wang's model in a setting where sellers are heterogeneous in the composition of their inventories. They show that a monopolist is more likely to post a …xed price when her inventory is homogeneous.
Competing Mechanism Designers
While the monopoly assumption is common in the study of mechanism design, several papers consider multiple sellers who compete for a …xed pool of buyers. The literature on competing mechanism designers shows that, as was seen in the context of a monopolist, the auction mechanism revenue-dominates the posted-price mechanism under a variety of assumptions. McAfee (1993) …nds that when sellers can o¤er any direct mechanism (see Myerson (1981) for a de…nition), auctions are optimal. Peters (1997) extends this result to a setting where sellers have asymmetric values. Like McAfee (1993) and Peters (1997) , I assume that a buyer knows his value when choosing between sellers. In contrast, other papers assume that buyers choose between sellers before learning their values. Of these, Damianov (2005) …nds that equilibrium mechanisms are payo¤ equivalent to second-price auctions, while Peters (1994) …nds that the posted-price mechanism is optimal in a model where sellers communicate with buyers sequentially. Ellison et al. (2004) address directly the issue of mechanism coexistence and deal with competing auction houses instead of competing auctioneers. The authors show that, while two auction houses (of possibly di¤erent sizes) can coexist, a monopolistic auction house is always an equilibrium. Another related set of papers consider directed search, where all sellers are symmetric and all buyers are symmetric. In Coles and Eeckhout (2003) , there exists a continuum of equilibria that do not uniquely tie down the payo¤s to buyers and sellers. In particular, the all posted-price equilibrium and the all auction equilibrium both exist, though sellers prefer the latter. In a two-buyers, two-sellers model, Julien et al. (2001) …nd that whether or not coexistence can exist in equilibrium depends on the model's timing assumptions. Speci…cally, when sellers choose mechanisms …rst and prices second, only the auction-auction equilibrium is subgame perfect. Coexistence is an equilibrium when mechanisms and prices are chosen simultaneously.
Coexistence

The Timing of Moves
Buyers are subscripted by i 2 [1; :::; N ], sellers by j 2 [1; :::; M ], and mechanisms by k 2 fA; P g. 2 Let N = N A + N P and M = M A + M P , but note that the analysis does not require that both markets are active. The game proceeds as follows:
Stage 0 Sellers observe their private information: their costs for participating in each mechanism and their use values, which are their payo¤s if their goods do not sell.
Stage 1 Buyers and sellers simultaneously enter either the auction or posted-price market.
Stage 2 Sellers simultaneously set prices.
Stage 3 All players observe the number of buyers and sellers who entered each mechanism as well as the prices and characteristics of all sellers. Buyers observe their values.
Stage 4 Buyers simultaneously choose between the sellers in their chosen mechanism and all players observe the number of buyers who chose each seller.
Stage 5 Buyers choose an action and each mechanism proceeds according to its rules.
2 I use the terminology 'buyers'and 'sellers'though some buyers may not purchase a good and some sellers may not sell. In the auction literature, my notion of buyers corresponds to 'potential bidders. ' I assume that all market participants are risk neutral. All decisions (choice of mechanism, choice of seller, etc.) are irreversible and I consider a one-shot game where unful…lled demand remains unful…lled and all sellers who do not sell retain their good.
Sellers
M sellers are endowed with a single, indivisible unit of a good that can be sold via an auction or at a posted price. I focus on a second-price auction, where the buyer submitting the highest bid obtains the good at a price equal to the maximum of the (public) reserve price and the second-highest bid. In the initial discussion, I abstract from several details of an eBay-style auction; these are discussed in Section 3. If the seller posts a …xed price, the good is sold to a willing buyer at the posted price. Buyers in the posted-price mechanism indicate their willingness to purchase at the posted price simultaneously. If multiple buyers indicate a willingness to buy a posted-price seller's good, I assume that the seller chooses each with an equal probability.
To analyze the sellers'mechanism-choice problem, I follow a random utility maximization model. In these models, agents have heterogeneous preferences over a discrete set of choices that can be broken into a systematic component and a random component, both of which are observed by the agent. An outside observer, however, never observes the random component and thus utility is random from the perspective of the econometrician (McFadden (1974) and Manski (1977) To …x ideas, I focus on a single explanation (outside of expected revenue concerns) for why sellers have idiosyncratic preferences over mechanisms. Namely, I assume that di¤erent mechanisms entail di¤erent costs for di¤erent sellers.
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If I de…ne ! jk as the cost to seller j of selling in mechanism k, the seller's expected pro…t from each mechanism is: jk = E(Rev jk ) ! jk . Using this, de…ne j as the seller's net expected pro…t from o¤ering an 3 Given that v 0 jk enters E(Rev jk ), 'expected revenue'is a slight abuse of terminology. I use this language instead of the alternative term, expected utility, because the latter includes ! jk while my formulation for E(Rev jk ) does not. 4 There are other factors that have not, to my knowledge, been explored in the context of mechanism choice. An uncertainty-averse seller prefers to post a …xed price because the auction price is uncertain. Sellers with little information may prefer the auction mechanism because the revenue loss is greater from a misspeci…ed posted price than from a misspeci…ed reserve price. 5 There is an important di¤erence between the notions of 'use value'and 'cost'when referring to sellers. A seller's use value is her payo¤ if the item does not sell, while a seller's cost is the amount incurred upon entering a particular mechanism, irrespective of whether the good sells. auction and assume the ! jk 's are i.i.d. draws from a distribution with cdf, G k ( ): j = E(Rev jA ) E(Rev jP ) ! j , where ! j = ! jA ! jP . Under my interpretation of the random component of sellers'pro…ts, ! j is how much more costly it is for seller j to sell in an auction rather than at a posted price. One interpretation is that the ! jk terms are the cost of …nding the optimal price for a given mechanism. Because setting a reserve price is quite di¤erent from setting a posted price, it seems reasonable that these costs are heterogeneous across sellers depending on characteristics speci…c to the seller or the good. Within this structure, I can generate any outcome in the sellers'mechanism-choice subgame spanning the spectrum from all sellers auctioning to all sellers posting a …xed price (and most importantly, including coexistence of mechanisms).
If the factors mentioned above play a role in explaining the coexistence of mechanisms, they can be captured by the ! jk terms as well. In the case of risk aversion, the cost terms can be interpreted as a risk premium. In the case of impatience, they can be interpreted as the cost of waiting for an auction to end (since posted-price goods on eBay always sell more quickly if they sell). If either was the sole reason for why di¤erent sellers entered di¤erent mechanisms, then the correct approach would be to model sellers as heterogeneous in either their coe¢ cients of risk aversion or their discount rates. The model could then be used to …nd the value of these parameters such that all seller more risk averse or more impatient than the cuto¤ value posted a …xed price. My view, however, is that the data available from eBay is not su¢ cient to distinguish between the numerous competing explanations. As a result, I model all factors outside of expected revenue concerns in an additive, mechanism-speci…c shock and refer to these shocks as costs. Expected utilities take the following forms:
The summation over N A governs the number of buyers who enter the auction mechanism, while the summation over n governs the number of buyers who choose an individual auctioneer. The expectation (E v 0 ) is taken with respect to v 0 . Given that sellers set prices before observing how many buyers and sellers enter each mechanism, buyers take an expectation with respect to v 0 to anticipate each price: reserve price, r, and posted price, p. Similarly:
Given that buyers enter the mechanisms before prices are announced or values are observed, these expected utilities are anonymous. It is for this reason that buyers take an expectation with respect to v 0 . Anonymity also explains why the q terms do not have a subscript for seller, implying that, when buyers forecast their expected utility, they expect all buyers to choose each seller with an equal probability (i.e.,
Seller Choice
Having entered mechanism k, buyers observe the realized number of buyers and sellers in each mechanism along with the prices and characteristics for all sellers. Each buyer chooses the seller in mechanism k that o¤ers him the highest utility, where utility has a systematic component and a random component. Prior to choosing between sellers, buyers observe both components of their utility function, while the econometrician never observes the random component. I parameterize the utility function of buyer i who chooses seller j in mechanism k as having the following components: the utility from seller j's good, v ijk ; the utility derived from a good with certain observable characteristics, X j ; and the disutility from the expected payment, jk , to seller j: U ijk = v ijk + X j k jk : v ijk is a match-speci…c scalar that captures the buyer's utility from seller j's good. Buyers are symmetric in that they all draw their values from the same distribution, F ( ). X j is of dimension 1 h, while k is an h 1 vector of parameters that governs how buyers value the observable covariates.
To complete the parameterization of the model, I need to handle the expected payment, jk , which (under risk neutrality) is the product of the expected probability of receiving seller j's good and the expected price. Consider each mechanism in turn. For the posted-price mechanism, the story is similar to the typical discrete-choice framework (e.g., McFadden
(1974)), but there is an important di¤erence. In my setting, a buyer who selects a postedprice seller j may be one of several buyers who select this seller. As the seller has only one good, buyers who choose between sellers must not only consider the price but also the probability with which they expect to get the good. Instead of fully modeling how buyers form these expectations, I take a reduced-form approach and posit that buyers view the expected payment as a simple function of the posted price: jP = p j P . For the auction mechanism, I assume that buyers take the expected auction payment to be a simple function of its clearest available signal, the reserve price: jA = r j A :
As is common (e.g., Berry (1994) ), I assume that buyers have an outside option, labeled seller 0, from whom they receive payo¤s of the form: U i0k = v i0k : 8 Buyers draw a value for the outside seller from the same distribution that they draw values for the inside sellers.
The remaining components of the utility that buyer i receives from seller 0 are normalized to zero, implying that we should view the X j and jk components for the inside sellers as di¤erences between seller j and the outside seller.
Trade
After choosing a particular seller, buyers consider their consumption value from the good, V ijk , when formulating a strategy. In particular, buyers choose an action (what to 8 In my model, buying from the outside seller is exiting the market after choosing a particular mechanism. This may occur if a buyer's value is below the lowest (reserve or posted) price. bid in an auction; whether or not to buy in the posted-price mechanism) based on the following speci…cation: V ijk = v ijk + Z j k . Before proceeding, I make two notational points. First, while observable characteristics enter the value speci…cation as they entered the utility function, I use Z j k in the value speci…cation to allow for the possibility that di¤erent characteristics in ‡uence a buyer's utility (i.e., his choice of seller) than in ‡uence a buyer's value (i.e., his choice of an action).
9 Second, I refer to V ijk as a buyer's consumption value and v ijk as a buyer's idiosyncratic value. Since sellers are endowed with one unit of a good with given characteristics, the seller cares about the distribution of V ijk because this is the distribution that enters the expression for the expected revenue. In particular, in the auction case, a buyer who is said to bid truthfully (as buyers do in the equilibrium of second-price auctions) bids V ijA . De…ne the distribution of V ijk as F k ( ) and the distribution
Because the choices of mechanism and seller are irreversible, buyers formulated their strategies in the trade stage in a similar way to buyers facing a monopolist. 10 I discuss the remaining details regarding buyers'strategies after introducing the details of an eBay-style auction, as these rules determine the modeling and estimation approach I use.
Compact Disc Sales on eBay
On eBay, sellers choose two prices: a (public) reserve price and a Buy-it-Now (BIN)
price. 11 The reserve price is also known as the minimum bid; bids below this price are not accepted. The BIN price allows buyers the opportunity to circumvent the auction process and win the good immediately. If the BIN price is set to in…nity, the mechanism is said to be an auction. If the BIN price is set equal to the reserve price, the mechanism is said to be a posted price. Sellers may also set a …nite BIN price that is above the reserve price, in what is known as a BIN auction. To maintain focus on common mechanisms that are available in a variety of on and o-ine settings, I ignore BIN auctions and consider only pure auctions and pure posted prices. 12 All prices are inclusive of shipping, which is set by the seller and ranges from $0 to $16 in these data.
Buyers who search for a particular good can view all open listings in either mechanism.
Listings on eBay are open a pre-determined length (chosen by the seller to be either 1; 3; 5; 7;
or 10 days) and buyers can place a bid or accept the posted price at any point before the listing closes. The rules of an eBay auction resemble those of a second-price, ascending (English) auction. The buyer placing the highest bid obtains the good at the price equal to the maximum of the reserve price and the second-highest bid. eBay employs proxy bidding, where the computer accepts a buyer's bid and incrementally raises the standing bid such that it is equal to the second-highest of the bids already placed. The buyer placing the highest of the bids already placed is listed as the current high bidder. If a seller chooses to sell at a posted price (i.e., sets the BIN price equal to the reserve price), the listing closes and the good is sold to the …rst buyer who selects the "Buy It Now" option. If either an auction or posted-price listing reaches its close without having attracted a bid or a buyer, the good is unsold and is retained by the seller.
My original sample contained 60 randomly-selected CDs. After gaining familiarity with the market at hand, I collected a new data set to be used for the current paper using only the most frequently listed CDs in the original data set. Considering only those CDs listed at least 100 times, the current sample has 21 CDs. At any given time, researchers can access the previous …fteen days of closed listings (i.e., sold or unsold goods whose end date was See Table 1 for a breakdown of the number of goods across mechanisms and condition of the good, where a good's condition is either new or used. For sellers, I model the eBay market as being generated from M sellers each o¤ering one good for sale. In actuality, the data set contains 6; 899 goods sold by 1; 859 sellers. I ignore this distinction in the discussion of the model and assume that the observations of multiple-listing sellers are independent.
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For the buyers'side of the market, there are several complications with the observed data.
Most problematic is the fact that a researcher using eBay data does not observe directly the number of potential buyers who enter either the auction or the posted-price mechanism.
In an eBay auction, the di¢ culty in observing the number of potential buyers is due to the truncation problem discussed in Song (2004) . As she describes, the number of buyers who bid on a particular auction is only a lower bound on the number of buyers who chose 13 An important next step is to consider the intermediate case between the common approach of one seller with M goods and my approach of M sellers each with one good. Moldovanu et al. (2007) model competing sellers with endogenously-determined capacities, but their sellers may only sell in an auction. that seller because only bids above the current standing bid are accepted. This implies a truncation of bidders whose bids would have been placed, but were not because the standing bid was above their willingness-to-pay at the time they attempted to bid.
14 For the postedprice mechanism, it is extremely common for the researcher not to observe the number of potential buyers because data for posted-price markets almost always shows in which mechanisms buyers are purchasing, not in which mechanisms buyers are entering. I discuss my approach for estimating N A and N P in Section 4.2.1.
I group observations into fCD; week; condition; mechanismg tuples. In doing so I argue that a buyer, when making his purchase decision, considers all sellers who have listed a given CD of a given condition in a given week. Any time frame chosen is somewhat arbitrary, but the results are robust to alternative time frames and it seems reasonable that buyers De…ne A j as a dummy variable equal to one if seller j o¤ers an auction and equal to zero if seller j sells via a posted price. The econometric speci…cation is:
This is standard for the most part, but my objective is di¤erent than the usual case. I am not interested in the e¤ect of some vector of covariates on the outcome variable, A j . Instead, since costs are unobserved by the econometrician, I use the above equation to infer sellers' costs from their mechanism choices. Speci…cally, I assume that, conditional on E(Rev A ) and E(Rev P ), ! jk follows a Gumbel distribution, G k ( ). I assume that the two cost distributions have the same scale, , but di¤erent location parameters, k . As a result,
follows a logistic distribution with parameters = A P and :
Using the formulations for the expected revenues (found in the Appendix), I construct a new variable equal to E(Rev jA ) E(Rev jP ). I can then estimate the parameters and in a logit maximum-likelihood regression of A j (the auction dummy for seller j) on E(Rev jA ) E(Rev jP ), which is now data. 15 The scale parameter for each cost distribution, G k ( ), is and the di¤erence between the two location parameters is (i.e., = A P ).
While the individual location parameters, A and P , are not identi…ed, indicates how the centers of the two distributions di¤er.
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The parameter is meaningful because the di¤erence between ! jA and ! jP determines which mechanism a seller enters. The magnitude of the ! jk terms only a¤ects whether the seller enters one of the mechanisms or exits the 15 I discuss how sellers form their expectations for these revenues in the Appendix. 16 The location parameter of a Gumbel distribution is its mode. Its mean equal to + 0:57721 , where 0:55721 is the Euler constant. market, and my data are limited to those sellers who entered a mechanism. Finally, it is worth pointing out the simplicity of this estimation approach as the structural parameters can be recovered using undergraduate-level regression techniques.
Pricing
Based on my timing assumptions, sellers do not observe the number of buyers or other sellers before pricing, but are aware of their costs and use values. Given the nature of the costs in this paper, they are irrelevant (i.e., sunk) when determining a price. The seller's use value, however, does matter. This highlights the distinction pointed out in footnote 5 between the two concepts. Since v 0 jk is the only unknown (by the econometrician) quantity in the expected revenue of the seller's chosen mechanism (equation (A1) or (A2)), each seller's use value is nonparametrically identi…ed. Speci…cally, I assume that sellers price optimally by maximizing the expected revenue of their chosen mechanism. Accordingly, I can infer each seller's use value from her pricing decision. Previous structural papers have analyzed the optimality of sellers' pricing decisions (e.g., Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) and Adams (2007)), but I model optimal pricing in a competitive environment, where sellers consider the adverse e¤ects on how many buyers by which they will be selected when choosing a price.
There are two ways to measure the intensity of price competition in this model: using the estimates of k or using prices. If k = 0, then prices have no in ‡uence on the way in which buyers select sellers. Assessing competitiveness via the k terms has the advantage that it does not require strong assumptions regarding how sellers map their use values into prices.
Alternatively, I can measure competitiveness with the prices charged by the sellers in the data set. For the auction, the Appendix shows that seller j's price will lie in the interval
and is seller j's optimal reserve price when A = 0. I construct a Lerner-type index equal to
For the posted-price mechanism, seller j will never post a price below v 0 jP , but there is no upper bound analogous to the auction case, as described in the Appendix. I measure the intensity of price competition
Buyers 4.2.1 Mechanism Choice
As described in Section 3, the number of buyers who entered each mechanism is unobserved. Here I outline my approach for overcoming this problem in order to identify B , the rate at which buyers mix between mechanisms.
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For the auction market, I set N A equal to the number of buyers who placed any bid in any seller's auction. This approximation will be quite good when bidding costs are low (as they should be in an online setting) and some sellers set a low reserve price. The latter is important because it allows a buyer with a low value to place a bid before the standing bid rises too high. The grouping described in Section 3 implies that I estimate N A separately for each fCD; week; conditiong.
Buyers enter the mechanism that o¤ers the highest expected utility, but do so before observing their values. As a result, the two mechanisms can coexist only when they o¤er buyers the same expected utility. I use this fact to overcome the common problem of not observing the number of buyers in a posted-price market. 18 If both mechanisms are active 17 In Section 6.3, I estimate an alternative model with an in…nite number of buyers in each mechanism. The results indicate that my approach of estimating N k is more appropriate.
18 Other solutions to this problem seem less appropriate in my case. Berry et al. (1995) , for example, in equilibrium, the following equality must hold:
Note that these di¤er from the expected utility terms outlined in Section 2.2.1 in two ways.
First, I do not use the distribution of N A and N P , but the realized number of buyers who entered each mechanism. This is, in essence, assuming that there is no aggregate uncertainty.
This means that, despite the fact that buyers mix between mechanisms simultaneously, buyers expect that the number of buyers in a mechanism will be equal to its average value (i.e., N A = B N and N P = (1 B ) N ). Second, buyers assume they will pay the mean price in their chosen mechanism, r or p, when they should take the expectation of the decision rule (r(v 0 ) or p(v 0 )) with respect to v 0 . This is again assuming that there is no aggregate uncertainty. Under these restrictions, equation (2) uniquely identi…es N P . 
Seller Choice
After entering a particular mechanism, buyers observe all components of their utility function (U ijk = v ijk + X j k jk ) and choose the seller who o¤ers the highest utility.
Buyers draw their idiosyncratic values, v ijk , conditional on X j and jk , from F values plays a critical role in any parametric estimation of market data because it determines assume that the number of buyers of automobiles is equal to the number of households in the United States. 19 More precisely, equation (2) uniquely identi…es N P once the distribution F P (V ) is known, but N P is needed to recover F P (V ). I use priors for P and P to solve forN P , use thisN P to solve for^ P and^ P , and iterate the process until it converges.
what fraction of the buyers have a willingness-to-pay at or below a particular price. In my setting, however, the parametric form of F v k ( ) plays a dual role in that it also determines the structure of the shares, q jk .
Given that the v ijk 's follow a Gumbel distribution, the share of buyers who choose seller j has the familiar multinomial-logit form:
where jA = r j A if k = A and jP = p j P if k = P . Likewise, the outside seller's share is:
This makes it clear that the probabilities sum to one,
The Gumbel distribution works particularly well because it provides a simple form for the q jk terms. It also does not impose symmetry, which is convenient given that there is An important assumption necessary for my estimation approach is that the v ijk terms 20 IIA places no restriction on the shares of two sellers in di¤erent mechanisms because at this stage, buyers cannot choose between sellers in di¤erent mechanisms (i.e., the mechanism choices are irreversible).
are uncorrelated with not only X j , but also prices. In essence, I assume that there are no unobserved seller or product characteristics and all relevant factors are captured by X j . It is reasonable in my setting to ignore unobserved heterogeneity because, in an online setting, all of the information that is available to buyers is also available to the econometrician.
Everything that buyers know about the seller and the good is viewable on the eBay listing page. At least in principle, the econometrician can collect data on all of these factors. If buyers have outside information, either from e-mail contact with the seller or from previous purchase experience with the seller, then simultaneity may be a problem (see Berry (1994) ).
It is important to point out, however, that the common way to deal with unobserved heterogeneity allows only product-level unobservables and would not control for di¤erent buyers having di¤erent information. E-mail contact or previous purchase experience are captured in v ijk so long as one is willing to assume that such information is i.i.d. across buyers. 
Trade
After buyers have chosen a seller, the game is modeled following the literature on incomplete auctions (Haile and Tamer 2003) . To illustrate, …rst consider the auction mechanism.
In an incomplete model, the exact way that buyers formulate their bidding strategies is left unspeci…ed. Recall that buyers bid based on their consumption values:
I follow Haile and Tamer and assume that buyers:
1. place a bid no larger than their consumption value, V ijA , and 2. do not allow an opponent to win at a price below V ijA . 21 The i.i.d. assumption imposes a private-values model, which I test in Section 6.1.
In an eBay-style auction, the proxy bidding system insures that these assumptions guarantee the two things needed for identi…cation (see Ackerberg et al. (2006) or Canals-Cerdá and Pearcy (2006) for details):
1. the buyer with the highest value wins the auction (otherwise, either he violated (2) or another buyer violated (1)) and 2. the buyer with the second-highest value places a bid in the amount of his value (otherwise, (2) implies that he should keep bidding).
I take an incomplete approach because the structural parameters of interest can be identi…ed without limiting the generality of the results to the context of a particular model of bidding. 22 Generality is important at this stage of the game, given the multitude of bidding strategies that buyers could employ. The disadvantage of the incomplete approach is that the researcher is limited to one bid per auction that can be taken as truthful (recall that the highest bid is not observed in English or eBay-style auctions). The truncation problem described in Song (2004) implies that bids below the second highest should not be taken as truthfully revealing a buyer's value because a buyer's bid may be truncated if the standing bid rises above his value.
I place similar restrictions on the buyers in the posted-price mechanism:
1. do not buy at a posted price higher than their consumption value, V ijP , and 2. do not allow a good to remain unsold at a price below V ijP .
22 Peters and Severinov (2006) detail a complete model that is well-suited for the eBay environment, but it is di¢ cult to extend their model to a structural setting because values are discrete (i.e., lie on a …nite grid) and there are multiple equilibria of the bidding game, only some of which can be characterized.
In the posted-price setting, however, these assumptions generate a clear strategy for posted-price buyers: indicate a willingness to buy if the posted price is less than or equal to V ijP and refuse to buy otherwise. Despite being generated from assumptions that are analogous to those made in the auction case, the model for posted-price buyers is, in fact, complete.
If I de…ne the parameters of F v k ( ) as k (location) and k (scale), then it follows that the parameters of F k ( ) are k + Z k k (location) and k (scale). Z k is a vector of the mean values for each covariate in Z k and has a k subscript for mechanism because I take the mean for sellers in each mechanism separately. The only remaining structural parameters are k , the parameter vector on the covariates Z in buyers'value speci…cation. These can be recovered via OLS, in what is known as a hedonic regression.
Estimation
For the buyers'side of the market, I express the probability that a good sells and estimate the structural parameters via maximum likelihood. The likelihood function says that the probability of sale is the probability that at least one of the n j buyers who chose seller j has a consumption value above her price, r j or p j , weighted by the distribution of n j :
Pr(Sale jP ) =
The structural parameters are the vector k , the scalar k , and the parameters of the value distribution, k and k .
There are several advantages of this approach. First, I am able to jointly estimate the seller-choice and trade stages of the game. Second, I avoid any potential selection bias by using all observations, while some approaches (in auction markets) use only auctions in which at least two bids were placed. 23 Third, data from posted-price markets are less amenable to the estimation techniques typically used on auction data because many of these techniques are based on the selling price. It is di¢ cult to make structural inference on the buyers'side of the posted-price market based on the selling price, given that the price is not determined as an outcome of the trade stage as it is in the auction market. Table 2 shows the mean values of N , M , B , and S for new and used goods separately.
Results
Sellers
Recall that B and S are the fraction of buyers and sellers who enter the auction market.
Relative to used goods, the market for new goods has more of both buyers and sellers. For used goods, the auction mechanism receives a larger share of both buyers and sellers. 24 Table   23 Giray et al. (2006) and Canals-Cerdá and Pearcy (2006) also use all auctions in their estimation, but I am unaware of another paper that uses an approach based on the probability of sale. 24 In contrast, Anderson et al. (2004) …nd that used goods were more likely (than new goods) to be sold via a posted-price in eBay data on Palm Vx handheld computers.
3 contains the ratio of buyers to sellers, both overall and for each market separately. First note that the number of buyers per seller is low, as described in the Introduction. Overall and for used goods,
is quite close to
. Alternatively, for new goods the buyer to seller ratios for the two markets are meaningfully di¤erent (t = 3:07, p-value = 0:00). As a result, some buyers (sellers) may have an incentive to deviate to the auction (posted-price) market. However, these summary statistics are only suggestive. Several factors are not taken into account, such as the mix of CDs across markets.
A seller's primary concern is revenue, de…ned as the payo¤ from selling the good times the probability of sale plus the payo¤ from the outside option times the probability of no sale.
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I also consider earnings, which are the payo¤ from selling the good times the probability of sale. Earnings are of interest because my formulation for earnings is more comparable with other papers that do not consider the value of the outside option. In Table 4 , revenues and earnings are expressed in both ex ante and ex post terms. Ex ante quantities re ‡ect expectations taken prior to the realization of n j , the number of buyers by whom seller j is chosen. As argued in Section 4.1.2, sellers maximize their ex ante expected revenue when setting a price. Ex post revenues and earnings consider the realized selling price of the good. Table 4 con…rms earlier …ndings from the online CD market that posted-price goods earn higher prices, but sell with a lower probability (Hammond 2007) . Auction revenues are higher both ex ante and ex post, but only ex ante expected revenues are meaningfully 25 All prices are inclusive of shipping. The script used to collect the data reported shipping as missing in 826 cases (12:6% of all auction observations and 9:7% of all posted-price observations). I use multiple imputation techniques to impute shipping for these observations, using the Stata package ice. Imputation is preferred to the alternatives such as mean-plugging or casewise deletion (Little and Rubin 2002) . The imputation model is available upon request.
higher (t ex ante = 19:23, t ex post = 1:42). For earnings, the auction market fares even better against the posted-price market. The di¤erence in the results for revenues and earnings is explained by the fact that posted-price sellers have more valuable outside options (i.e., they have higher use values) than auctioneers.
As I argue in Section 4.1.2, each seller's use value can be inferred from her pricing decision.
As a result, the distribution of use values, H (v 0 ), is nonparametrically identi…ed. Figure 1 provides a histogram of the use values overlaid with a kernel density plot separately for each market. While the means (shown in Table 4 The …nal item of interest for sellers is the distribution of costs, G(!). The results from a logit estimation of the auction dummy on the di¤erence in expected revenues are in Table   5 . 26 Intuitively, I …nd that sellers who expect a larger revenue advantage for the auction mechanism are more like to sell in an auction. The main purpose of Table 5 , however, is in transforming the coe¢ cients to recover the parameters of G(!), (location) and (scale).
27 G(!) shows how sellers view the cost of o¤ering an auction in relation to the costs of posting 26 The unit of observation in this estimation is an individual seller. If the seller lists the same CD of the same condition in the same week, she is counted only once. This assumes that sellers choose between mechanisms separately for each CD and separately for new and used goods. 27 If B 0 is the constant term and B 1 is the coe¢ cient on E(Rev A ) E(Rev P ) in the logit estimation of the auction dummy, then = a …xed price. The fact that is less than 0 says that the auction mechanism is less costly, on average.
Taken together, the …ndings for sellers'outside options and their costs imply that costs are not the entire story. Costs do not completely explain the coexistence of auctions and postedprice selling because costs, on average, favor the auction mechanism. An interpretation is that there are two types of posted-price sellers: (1) sellers with a high use value and (2) sellers with a low use value but with a large ! jA relative to ! jP . The decision of type (1) sellers to enter the posted-price mechanism can be explained in the context of a monopolist. In the monopoly case, the revenue advantage of the auction over the posted-price mechanism decreases in v 0 and is at its largest when v 0 = 0. In the polar extreme when v 0 equals the upper bound of the buyers'value distribution, the two mechanisms generate the same expected revenue because the seller will set a price such that she never sells the good. In my model, the same factors are at work. Sellers with valuable outside options view the mechanisms more similarly than sellers with low-valued outside options. As a result, the coexistence of mechanisms is more likely to occur in the former case. In contrast, the decision of type (2) sellers cannot be rationalized by their v 0 . Here, the model predicts that these sellers must have a su¢ ciently large ! jA ! jP . It is likely that these sellers view the auction mechanism as more costly for reasons such as risk aversion, impatience, inventories, and capacity constraints, with di¤erent factors mattering for di¤erent sellers. Table 6 reports a hedonic regression of the good's selling price on the characteristics (Z) that should in ‡uence buyers'values. These characteristics are the log of the seller's feedback score, her feedback rating, a dummy variable for new goods, and CD and week …xed e¤ects.
Buyers
While both the feedback score and the feedback rating proxy for the seller's reputation, the former measures quantity and the latter measures quality. 28 The seller's reputation matters somewhat, but the results re ‡ect a weak relationship that has been found elsewhere (e.g., Ackerberg et al. (2006) and Canals-Cerdá and Pearcy (2006)). The coe¢ cient on the dummy variable for new goods indicates that, for the auction market, new goods sell for $1:11 more than used goods, while the di¤erence is $2:13 for posted-price goods.
The key results for buyers are found in Table 7 . This estimation includes the characteristics (X) believed to in ‡uence which seller a buyer chooses. For the auction market, X includes all of the characteristics in Z in addition to the length of the auction and the reserve price. The length is either 1; 3; 5; 7; or 10 days. It should in ‡uence which seller a buyer chooses, but not the buyer's value. For the posted-price market, I do not observe the length of time that the good was available for sale unless it did not sell. Here, X includes all of the characteristics in Z in addition to the posted price. The coe¢ cients on the prices are the k terms, shown as negative numbers. Buyers respond in the expected way to higher prices, but I discuss these results in detail in the next section.
The distribution of values is the key primitive for buyers. While the model provides no formal prediction on the stochastic ordering of the two distributions, it seems reasonable that they should be similar across markets. 29 The results suggest that, on average, buyers 28 Both measures are calculated by eBay on the basis of post-transaction reports submitted by buyers on the sellers from whom they purchase a good. The seller's score is the number of positive reports minus the number of negative reports, while her rating is the number of positive reports divided by the total number of reports. Both are prominently displayed on the listing page of every good the seller lists for sale. I add 2 to the feedback score so that all sellers have a positive value and take the log to account for nonlinearities. 29 Because buyers draw their values after entering a particular mechanism, the model does not require the distributions to be the same (hence, F k ( ) has a k subscript). But, if the results suggest that the distributions are very di¤erent, then the assumption that buyers mix between mechanisms may seem unreasonable.
value auctioned goods at $12:13 and posted-price goods at $10:93. The di¤erence between F A (V ) and F P (V ) (in terms of their central location) is not statistically signi…cant (t = 0:39, p-value = 0:70), but $1:20 is an economically meaningful amount given the inexpensive nature of CDs. If I remove the e¤ects of observable characteristics (X) and look only at buyers' idiosyncratic values, the di¤erence across the auction and posted-price market is larger, yet still statistically insigni…cant (t = 1:16, p-value = 0:25). I also fail to reject that A = P (t = 1:11, p-value = 0:27), but it should be noted that these two parameters are meaningfully di¤erent ( A = 5:69, P = 12:23). The test fails to reject only because P is estimated with a great deal of noise.
The remaining quantities in Table 7 show the e¤ects of observable characteristics on which seller a buyers chooses. The quality of the seller's reputation (her rating) matters in the expected way, but is estimated imprecisely. The quantity of her reputation hurts a seller in the auction market and does little to help in the posted-price market. Results concerning reputation on buyer entry are mixed, largely because the observed data provide only a noisy proxy for seller quality. While the length of the listing is not observed in the posted-price data, length has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect in the auction market.
Finally, I use estimates of the share of buyers that each seller receives, q jk , to …nd the share of buyers who exit the market, q 0k . 23:8% of auction buyers and 69:2% of posted-price buyers exit and choose seller 0. More posted-price buyers exiting than auction buyers is consistent with buyers exiting when their value is too low given that the lowest posted price is above the lowest reserve price for all CDs in these data.
Intensity of Price Competition
As argued in Section 4.1.2, the estimates for A and P are useful measures of the competitiveness of the auction and posted-price markets. I calculate the elasticity of q jk with respect to price, measured at the means for each market. The auction elasticity is 2:06, while the posted-price elasticity is 4:62. These elasticities suggest that buyers are highly responsive to changes in price, to a greater extent for posted prices than for reserve prices. That buyers are more responsive to the posted price is intuitive given that the posted price is the price that a buyer actually pays, while the reserve price is only the starting point for the bidding process.
I also measure the intensity of price competition using Lerner-type indices equal to 
Consumer Surplus
First consider the auction market. The realized consumer surplus in an individual auction is the di¤erence between the highest bidder's value and the winning bid (i.e., the maximum of the second-highest bid and the reserve price). Because the highest-bidder's value is not observed, I follow the convention of estimating expected consumer surplus (Song (2004) and Giray et al. (2006) ). De…ne b w as the winning bid and let V (n 1:n) A refer to the buyer with the second-highest out of n values:
The formulation in the posted-price market is quite similar, but the logic is di¤erent. As before, we want the expected value of the buyer who obtains the good minus the price he pays. However, the buyer who obtains the good in the posted-price market is chosen randomly from the set of buyers who chose the seller and have a value above her posted price. The resulting expected consumer surplus is:
On average, the expected consumer surplus per good is, on average, $7:91 and $14:88 in the auction and posted-price markets, respectively. 30 After calculating producer surplus, I
…nd the share of total surplus that is received by consumers: E[ for the posted-price market. One explanation for posted-price buyers receiving a higher (absolute) surplus is the larger variance of F P (V ) relative to F A (V ), implying that the posted-price distribution has more weight in its right tail.
Testable Assumptions
30 While it may not be intuitive, it is clear from the formulations that expected consumer surplus in both markets is independent of N or N k . For the auction market, Giray et al. (2006) provide a simple proof. For the posted-price market, E[CS P ] is independent of N P because the winning buyer is chosen randomly among those with a value above the posted price. While the surplus of an individual buyer depends on N P , E[CS P ] does not.
The Nature of Demand
The main restriction I place on the demand structure is that of a symmetric, independentprivate-values (SIPV) framework. By using a SIPV model, I assume that all buyers draw their values from F v k (v) and that these values are i.i.d. random variables. In an auction setting, Athey and Haile (2002) show that the SIPV framework is testable if either: (1) more than one bid per auction is observed; or (2) there is exogenous variation in the number of buyers. While multiple bids are observed in eBay data, the truncation of bidders discussed earlier implies that the interpretation of bids below the second highest is unclear. As a result, I am unable to take the common approach that exploits the reclusive relationship between distributions of di¤erent N 's (Athey and Haile (2002) , equation (13)).
On the other hand, there are reasons to believe that I have exogenous variation in the number of buyers. Recall that I group observations into fCD; week; condition; mechanismg tuples and estimate N k separately for each group. Accordingly, N k varies by CD, by week, by condition (new or used), and by mechanism. If the variation along one of these dimensions can be taken as plausibly exogenous, then I can estimate F v k ( ) separately across this dimension and test for the appropriateness of the SIPV assumptions.
I argue that time is the most likely dimension to generate exogenous variation in N k .
While the demand for CDs certainly changes over time, the sample period of 45 days is likely short enough to avoid depreciation in demand due to a CD losing popularity. Further, the argument that there may be additional di¤erences between distributions for the early and late periods provides more evidence against the null, biasing the test against me. I divide the sample into two periods and test 
Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives
The share of buyers that each seller receives, q jk , is restricted by the IIA property of the Gumbel distribution. To check whether IIA is rejected in these data, I follow the testing approach of Hausman and McFadden (1984) and compare the results from the full model to the results when buyers can choose from a restricted set of sellers. I choose the restricted set to include all sellers except the low-price seller, dropping one seller for each fCD; week; condition; mechanismg group. I …nd that IIA is not rejected in these data 
Multinomial Distribution
I assume that the number of buyers who choose each seller follows a multinomial distribution. To implement this model, I develop an approach for estimating N A (count the number of bidders who bid on any auction of that CD in that week of that condition) and N P (solve for the N P that makes buyers indi¤erent between mechanisms). An alternative approach is to assume that the number of potential buyers in each market is in…nite and use a Poisson distribution for the number of buyers who choose each seller. Under this assumption, the mean number of arrivals, jk , at each seller j is a function of X j and jk (recall that is the payment a buyer expects to make). In my setting, jk is interpreted as the mean number of buyers who arrive at seller j's listing before it closes. One downside to using a Poisson approach is that it is more di¢ cult to motivate the empirical speci…cation with an underlying theoretical framework, such as the random utility maximization model used in this paper. The reduced-form speci…cation is: jk = X j k jk , where jA = r j A and jP = p j P as before. The likelihood functions are:
Estimates based on the Poisson speci…cation are shown in Table 9 . The di¤erence between these results and those in Table 7 are stark. The estimate of is only signi…cantly di¤erent from zero in the auction market. Further, the distribution of buyers' values is shifted toward lower values in relation to the distribution recovered using a multinomial approach.
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Because the multinomial and Poisson models are non-nested, I check the appropriateness of the multinomial speci…cation using a Vuong (1989) test. The results indicate that the multinomial approach is closer to the truth (for the auction market, Z = 5:89, p-value = 0:00;
for the posted-price market, Z = 3:16, p-value = 0:00).
31 With the Poisson approach, while the number of buyers is said to be in…nite, in practice, it is necessary for the researcher to specify an upper bound for the summation. I …nd that the mean of the distribution varies depending on the upper bound because, in order to explain the number of items that remain unsold in the data, the buyers'value distribution must shift to the left as the upper bound gets larger. I choose an upper bound based on the seller who is chosen by the largest number of buyers in the multinomial model (max(q jA N A ) = 7, max(q jP N P ) = 4). 
Appendix
Seller j's expected revenue for each mechanism is:
and f k (V ) is its corresponding density:
The parameters B , k , and k , along with the parameters of F k (v) are common knowledge, implying that sellers can forecast the expected revenue in each mechanism. The expected revenue in the mechanism that the seller entered can be found by inserting these parameters along with the price charged (r j or p j ) and v 0 jk . On the other hand, the expected revenue in the mechanism that the seller did not enter is more complicated. In theory, the seller could use the structural parameters along with v 0 jk to calculate the optimal price in the other mechanism. I argue that it seems unlikely that sellers are able to engage in this level of optimization. Instead, I assume that sellers use a heuristic for the price that they would charge (counterfactually) in the mechanism that they did not enter. Speci…cally, I
assume that sellers expect to charge a price in each mechanism that earns the same share of buyers. That is, I assume that, when forecasting their expected revenues from each mechanism, sellers expect the following equality to hold:
Using this restriction, sellers can calculate the optimal price in one mechanism and use this equation to solve for the price in the other mechanism. Once a seller knows these two prices,
given that she observes her use value, the expected revenues are known and the seller chooses the mechanism o¤ering the highest pro…t, where jk = E(Rev jk ) ! jk .
To provide a point of comparison for optimal pricing in my model, consider two results from the auction literature:
1. The optimal reserve price for a monopolist, r M , solves the following equation (Myerson 1981) :
2. One result from the literature on competing sellers (see Section 1.2) is that, under certain conditions, all sellers set their reserve prices at their use values for the good, that is, r C j = v 0 j . Many of these results rely on limit concepts where the number of sellers goes to in…nity (e.g., McAfee (1993) and Peters and Severinov (1997) ).
In my model, the optimal reserve price, r j , maximizes equation (A1). Di¤erentiating this function shows that r j = r 
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The optimal posted price cannot be bounded as easily because with P = 0, the optimal posted price in my model depends n j , while with A = 0, the optimal reserve price does not.
As a result, any comparison between a seller in my model when P = 0 and a monopolist depends on the number of buyers that the monopolist faces. Consider a monopolist and de…ne p M j as her optimal posted price when facing n j buyers: Notes: The number of goods listed for sale in each market is shown by condition of the good. I drop 163 observations that correspond to fCD; week; conditiong groups for which either the auction or posted-price market was inactive (i.e., M k = 0). Notes: For this and subsequent tables, standard errors are in parentheses. N and M are the total numbers of buyers and sellers, respectively. B and S are the share of buyers and sellers, respectively, who enter the auction mechanism. is the ratio of all buyers to all sellers.
is the ratio of buyers to sellers in market k. 
0:000
Notes: and denotes signi…cance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. The unit of observation is an individual seller as described in footnote 26. The values for (location) and (scale) are the estimates of the parameters of the sellers'cost distribution, G(!). The coe¢ cient on E(Rev A ) E(Rev P ) and the constant term are the estimates from a logit maximum-likelihood estimation of the auction dummy. 
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